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JAMES JOYCE, MINIMALIST 
 
 
everything is less than 
as it is 
everything is more. 
Paul Celan, ‘Cello Entry’ (1967)1 
 
Minimally less. No more. 
Samuel Beckett, Ill Seen Ill Said (1981)2 
 
As Dirk Van Hulle observes, the German Letter of 9 July 1937 sent by  Samuel Beckett to 
Axel Kaun is now more frequently than not preceded by the epithet “oft-quoted”.3 We are 
nonetheless beholden, while acknowledging that frequency of quotation, to also repeating it, 
bound to the concision with which it both outlines a Beckettian poetics and announces a volta 
in modernism through the distinction of that poetics from the Joycean mode. According to 
Beckett, his ‘literature of the unword’4 would differ from that of Joyce by exploiting 
‘impotence, ignorance’ instead of ‘tending toward omniscience and omnipotence’.5 Rather 
than ‘making words do the absolute maximum of work’, he would attempt a ‘kind of work 
[…] in which I am not master of my material’.6  This reading identifies an epochal difference 
between the two that would later become a critical commonplace, situated in a valorization of 
the appropriation of language and excesses to which Joyce finally extends it, leading to his 
designation as a virtuoso of language, a ‘maximalist’ writer; or, in the words of John Gross 
(echoing those of Beckett), ‘a modern, or modernistic, master’ who revels in and celebrates a 
sheer proliferation of words.7 This view of Joyce as a maximalist writer,  of a Joycean 
maximalism that is axiomatic of the work, gained significant traction not only in Joyce 
studies but in  the entire field of modernism  and beyond. Indeed, it is his example that is 
invoked in the seminal definition of literary maximalism and minimalism by John Barth, in 
his 1986 New York Times  review, ‘A Few Words About Minimalism’, for which Barth 
famously advances his proposition of ‘two roads to grace’: 
 
The medieval Catholic Church recognized two opposite roads to grace: the via 
negativa of the monk’s cell and the hermit’s cave, and the via affirmativa of human 
affairs, of being in the world whether or not one is of it. Critics have aptly borrowed 
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those terms to characterize the difference between Mr. Beckett, for example, and his 
erstwhile master James Joyce, himself a maximalist except in his early works.8 
 
In contradistinction to maximalism, minimalism is figured by Barth as ‘a radical economy of 
artistic means’, an ‘artistic austerity’, the phraseology indicative of a semantic field that can 
easily be traced to modernist studies as it conceptualizes Beckett and, through oppositional 
polarization, Joyce. In what follows I wish to ask, through a close reading of examples from 
A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, Ulysses and Finnegans Wake, to what extent 
Joycean writing exhibits a more ambivalent relation to the word than Beckett’s attribution 
would suggest, proposing a further nuancing of Joycean maximalism and, by extension, an 
interrogation of the terms of maximalism and minimalism.  
As Barthian taxonomies, ‘maximalism’ and ‘minimalism’ first gained purchase with 
the emergence of American postmodernism in the late 1980s: exemplified by the short stories 
of  such as Raymond Carver, minimalists were typified as working in the short story or 
novella form and combining brevity of length with a concomitant economy of style, whereas 
maximalist writing, exemplified by works such as Thomas Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow, 
was conversely typified by an excess in both length and form. In the years since Barth 
popularized them the terms arguably however became accepted to the point of being rendered 
passé.  But , very recently, signs of a resurgence of interest have been registered in two 
distinct but related critical fields. 
One of those fields in which the binary has re-emerged and been nuanced is in the 
current debate that focuses on the new realism in the North American novel as a renaissance 
of literary maximalism; in fact, two contemporary monographs, Stefano Ercolino’s The 
Maximalist Novel: from Thomas Pynchon’s ‘Gravity’s Rainbow’ to Roberto Bolaño’s ‘2666’  
and Maximalism in Contemporary American Literature: The Uses of Detail  by Nick Levey 
testify by their very entitling to the currency of the term.9 Ercolino identifies in his text what 
he presents as ten distinguishing features of the American maximalist novel from the 1970s 
to the new millennium, specifically their length; encyclopaedic mode; dissonant chorality, or 
plurivocity; diegetic exuberance; completeness; narratorial omniscience; paranoid 
imagination; intersemioticity; ethical commitment; and hybrid realism 10 At least eight of 
these traits could, however, be said to be equally common features  of Ulysses and Finnegans 
Wake, and are moreover discernible in Beckett’s implicit distinction between his approach 
and that of Joyce in the 1937 letter: an emphasis on length; encyclopaedic mode; plurivocity; 
diegetic exuberance; completeness; narratorial omniscience; intersemioticity, and ethical 
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commitment are characteristic of readings of Joyce as maximalist, or perhaps more accurately 
what might be termed maximalist readings of Joyce, a differentiation to which I  will later 
return. What is most striking in his account is that, when discussing the encyclopaedic mode 
– one of the paradigms of which is the ‘modern epic’ (the others being the ‘systems novel’ 
and the ‘mega-novel’) – Ercolino has recourse to Joyce, not simply as an example of the 
paradigm but as the exemplar by which it is defined: 
 
After the World War II [sic], when the ideological apparatus of modernity inexorably 
collapsed under the blows of history, a certain brand of postmodern literature 
remained stubbornly anchored to the encyclopedic and universalizing dream of 
modernism. A dream of utopian power, which seemed, and still seems, without limits. 
[…] Let us try to give a brief account of this, starting with the masterpiece of 
modernist encyclopedism: Joyce’s Ulysses. 
 The encyclopedism of Ulysses is a commonly recognized fact.11 
 
Ercolino affirms Joyce as definitional of the encyclopaedic modern epic and therefore of a 
maximalist paradigm, drawing upon the earlier and foundational figuration of literary 
maximalism and minimalism by John Barth, in whose analysis the Ur-poles for these 
typologies are Joyce and Beckett.  
Meanwhile, within Joyce studies  there has also been a renewed interest in 
maximalism, as evidenced inter alia in discussions by Jeremy Colangelo, Dirk Van Hulle, 
P.J. Murphy and Friedhelm Rathjen.12 This work, however, tends to nuance the binary 
distinction between a Beckettian ‘art of impoverishment’ (as Leo Bersani and Ulysse Dutoit 
term it) and a Joycean mastery.13 Van Hulle, for example, acknowledges the perpetuation of 
Beckett’s reception of Joyce while seeking to shade the terms of engagement: 
 
[…] Beckett told James Knowlson that the core of his poetics was a “lack of 
knowledge” (Knowlson 1996, 352) and he insisted on presenting his own way as 
opposed to James Joyce’s. Beckett’s insistence on this dichotomy has often been 
adopted in Beckett studies and the difference between the two authors has been 
presented as the antithesis of Joycean encyclopedism versus Beckettian “anti-
encyclopedism” (Baker 1996, xiv). But it is becoming increasingly clear that this 
contrast is too black-and-white.14 
 
 
The contemporary poet Alice Fulton writes of high modernist maximalist poetry that 
‘[m]odernist maximalism, as practised by Pound and Eliot, was a structure of depletion […] 
To risk a generalization, their modernism beautifully encountered what-is-not and gave 
ample voice to absence’.15 The difference between modernist poetry and a modernist prose 
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poetics, as perceived in Joyce, is that his maximalism is conventionally identified as a 
totalizing drive rather than as an aesthetics of exhaustion. The implicit and unexamined link 
lies in the equivalence between formal signifiers of a maximalist aesthetic, whether visual – 
such as length, size, or, on the level of the syntactical unit, sentence structure – or technical – 
for example, in the use of interior monologue and free indirect discourse, or in the 
adumbration of quotidian detail – with a maximalist philosophy reflected in the writing. This 
implication can again be identified in Beckett studies and derived from Beckett’s own 
reception of Joyce, whom he credited as ‘making words do the absolute maximum of work’  
while attributing that ‘maximum’ to a proliferation of the word itself, contrasting it with his 
own divergent aesthetics wherein words would be whittled down to a minimum in order to 
bear the maximum pressure, thereby signifying an eschewal of the mastery that he 
ascertained in Joyce.16 For Beckett a loss of mastery is not merely technical but indicative of 
a philosophical position that rejects a metaphysical vision of the world and ontology founded 
in presence, and of the capability of language as a medium to represent and transmit that 
presence. The Beckettian position is analogous to that of Martin Heidegger, for whom 
‘language is the house of being. In its home human beings dwell’.17 For Heidegger, it is not 
man who speaks language, but ‘language that speaks man’: ‘[m]an acts as though he were the 
shaper and master of language, while in fact language remains the master of man’.18 People 
are  constituted by language rather than in control of it, and language so conceived is no 
longer initiated from an originary presence but rather marked by an originary absence. With 
its formal predilection towards brevity, attenuation and dimunition, minimalism is linked to a 
philosophical piercing of the veil; maximalism, by contrast, remains connected to an 
‘authoritative, even redemptive’ potential for literature to recuperate absence and dissolution 
in a grand narrative or synthesising vision.19   
 While Joyce’s early works are regarded as formally minimalist, an interrogation of A 
Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man  indicates how elements of his later work that are 
recognized as formally maximalist may be disarticulated from a co-extension to a 
metaphysical worldview implicated by mastery, encyclopaedism and totalization. From the 
very beginning, the first lines of A Portrait, announce Stephen as a political subject in 
language, in that they demonstrate that language subjects us to power and we are therefore 
made as political subjects through language, which subjects us to the power structures of the 
world that are themselves constructed and maintained in discourse. , The reader sees that 
Stephen’s world is made present by articulation and extends only as far as his language 
reaches? . He is subject first to the Father, who names him  ‘baby tuckoo’ (P 5), and that is 
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how he comes to understand himself in relation to the world and  to the paternal? .He 
understands  the contours of the world through story and song, and by material appropriation; 
his mother is known to him by three things, the oilsheet; her smell; and the hornpipe that she 
plays. His world encompasses  his relatives, who are relative to each other: Uncle Charles, 
older than Dante, both of whom are older than his mother and father, and there is a revelatory 
moment when he realizes that mother and father are universal nouns and categories of 
relation (‘The Vances lived in number seven. They had a different father and mother. They 
were Eileen’s father and mother’ [P. 5-6]). Throughout the novel, Stephen’s world expands 
or is estranged according to his command and understanding of language. When at 
Clongowes, this incipient tension grows as Stephen becomes aware of the semiotic structure 
of difference and the plurality of the signifier: ‘[h]e kept his hands in the side pockets of his 
belted grey suit. That was a belt round his pocket. And belt was also to give a fellow a belt’ 
(P 7). In this homonymic disjunction between signifier and signified, there is the realization 
that one word does possess only one meaning, leading Stephen to question faith in language 
even as he recognizes its inescapability. At points this tension seems to resolve only to return 
further amplified: 
 
God was God’s name just as his name was Stephen. Dieu was the French for God and 
that was God’s name too; and when anyone prayed to God and said Dieu then God 
knew at once that it was a French person that was praying. But though there were 
different names for God in all the different languages in the world and God 
understood what all the people who prayed said in their different languages still God 
remained always the same God and God’s real name was God (P 13) 
 
Stephen here tries to reconcile the structuration of language through a sign system with the 
desire to return to a stable meaning in the transcendental signified: ‘God’s real name was 
God’. Even as he rehearses this logic, however, ‘different’ is repeated three times and marks 
the singularity of the word. He intuitively knows it not to be sustainable, understanding that 
the concept of the proper name, and hence the act of naming itself, is an unstable one: God’s 
name is only God in English, therefore it is not his ‘real’ name, therefore God no longer 
correlates to a stable truth that can be named in and as language. Stephen elides the difference 
of language for stability, yet it keeps on returning; here, quite literally, in the repetition of 
difference.  
 This tension is made explicit in a commonly-cited example from chapter five, when 
Stephen states that ‘[t]his race and this country and this life produced me […] I shall express 
myself as I am’ (P 178). Although this is most often read as a statement of liberation and a 
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temporal shift between past and present states (in other words, ‘I will now express myself, 
free of the forces that have heretofore bound me’), it may instead be interpreted  as a 
temporal continuum; in this view  there is a recognition of being ontologically constituted by 
those forces, yet driven necessarily to express oneself while being aware that   the self is not 
autonomous but  limited and formed by those modes  of production. Stephen is not 
expressing a lack that can potentially be made whole through the exercise of his art, but a 
constitutive lack: there is no possibility of being made whole, since one is produced as an 
exile in language, a stranger to oneself. The awareness of self-alienation realized in language 
is both a general principle and attains a specific historical aspect in A Portrait; for example, 
when conducting his  conversation with the Dean of Studies, Stephen considers his political 
subjection to the ‘acquired speech’ of the colonizer through which he is brought into the 
world in an a priori state of subjugation (P 166). This thematic position in A Portrait 
generates an understanding of the connection between ontology and language that is more 
commonly identified with a later, Beckettian, aesthetics, wherein the coexistence of necessity 
and limitation,  persistence and stasis, are mimetically mirrored in the visuals of the form – 
the brevity of length, the diminution of the syntactical unit, and the poverty of language – and 
made the subject of the prose.  
While Alice Fulton’s account of modernist poetics tempers its maximalist impulse, it 
nevertheless retains a sense of upholding structure by rendering absence in full (‘ample’) 
voice and retains a belief in plenitude by virtue of a memorializing of plenitude lost. The 
implication is that there is something to be lost, an erstwhile presence – and, potentially, to be 
recovered. In Joyce’s work absence is extended beyond representation to form, such that it 
problematises the equation of whatever excess or stylistic maximalism exists in the later texts 
with plenitude and totalization. Were we to disarticulate the equation between that excess and 
philosophical presence, we could begin to consider how, even though words proliferate, they 
inscribe  an originary difference and absence  into the text and counter the synonymity of 
maximalism with mastery at the same time as they t complicate the identification of a 
philosophical, aesthetic, and formal convergence in minimalism. Duncan McColl Chesney 
explains Beckett’s minimalism in these terms when he equates the ‘modern impossibility of 
realism’ as expressed in ‘the minimal abstractions of [his] great works’ that exhibit 
‘resistance of the medium’ itself, with ‘the dark truth of the poverty of experience offered up 
unwaveringly’.20 Chesney discusses the dilemma of the artist compelled to express the 
inexpressible with insufficient means in terms of minimalism; as in accounts  of maximalism, 
he acknowledges that the term is developed first in other disciplines before entering into 
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literature, and that its critical application  remains underdeveloped and its tenets 
positivistically derived from a small number of exemplars. Following Carla Locatelli’s 
expression of Beckett’s ‘subtractive’ mode21 (itself a Beckettian coinage in relation to Joyce), 
Chesney identifies this ever-attenuating aesthetics  with a self-reflexivity in the prose , which 
makes of it both subject and performative form; he juxtaposes this with Pascale Casanova’s 
reading of Beckett proferring that she situates him ‘within a tradition of modernist purism’ 
and that ‘this form of purism in Beckett is certainly a form of minimal or minimalizing art’ 22 
The equivalence between ‘purism’ and minimalism suggests a teleological progression from 
high to late modernism whereby the latter is purged of the naïve excesses of the former even 
as it also reaffirms an equivalence between formal reduction, aesthetic minimalism, and 
philosophical sophistication located in an eschewal of metaphysical certainty. 
While my reading of A Portrait seeks to problematize this equation, there remains the 
question of how Ulysses and Finnegans Wake can be perceived to support an interrogation of 
‘maximalist’ Joyce and, from that interrogation, a subversion of the minimalist and 
maximalist categories. Maximalist readings of Ulysses accord the novel, as a facet of its 
encyclopaedic realism, a humanist mode focused on the realization of character psychology 
and interfamilial relations. Perhaps the most high-profile example of such a reading of recent 
years is that promoted by Declan Kiberd, in ‘Ulysses’ and Us: The Art of Everyday Living , 
the stated mission of which is to ‘reconnect Ulysses to the everyday lives of real people’, 
positioning it as a humanist novel against theoretical readings and effacing the text in favour 
of utilizing it as a self-help manual for learning ‘lived wisdom’.23 A discourse reverberates 
across Kiberd’s accounts: that of everyday lives, real people, the ordinary mind, ‘complex’ 
but ‘affirmative’ , a representation of humanity as a collection of ‘simple souls’  and Ulysses 
as the simple story of those souls.24 Although their methodologies are dissimilar, this is also 
the version of Ulysses critiqued in Leo Bersani’s ‘Against Ulysses’ , an essay which 
disparages Joyce for what Bersani posits as an apparently conservative humanism 
masquerading as avant-garde experiment.25 Where Kiberd promotes this Ulysses, Bersani 
regards the style as a Trojan horse that reveals at its centre a novel with  traditional 
properties: 
 
If we were unaware of the avant-gardist claims made for Joyce’s novel, we would, I 
think, have little hesitation in speaking of it as a psychological work, as a novel of 
character. We might of course be bothered by what an old-fashioned critical discourse 
has called a disproportion between the technical machinery and the psychological or 
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“human” content, machinery that frequently obscures our view of what is 
happening.26 
 
For Bersani this is the truth, in all senses, of the novel. His analysis enters logically into the 
rhetoric from which it borrows and denigrates as ‘snobbish’ (Bersani 1990, p. 157) any 
inquiry that would seek to read Ulysses in any way other than to corroborate it as a novel of 
personality.27 Its technique ceded to the power of expression that characterizes the social 
realist novel and is implicitly indicative of Joyce’s maximalism.28 This view returns to 
Ulysses as a type of the classical nineteenth-century realist novel made contemporary by the 
ornamental stylistics of modernist mimesis, rather than as a new form that would challenge 
the grounds of the novel itself, its conceptions of plot and character representative of a 
communal reality external to language but transmitted through  language. Of Ulysses’ central 
protagonist Bersani writes:  
 
Bloom is eminently appealing and eminently ordinary. In one of the exchanges that 
constitute the impersonal catechism of “Ithaca,” Bloom is called “Everyman or 
Noman.” In any case, he is a Sweet Man, and if Joyce has inspired a kind of 
attachment and anecdotal curiosity (about him, about the streets of Dublin) evocative 
of that affection for Jane Austen which was for so long an obstacle to her being 
thought of as a serious writer, it is largely because of his success in creating Bloom. 
[…] The Blooms are an identifiable couple, and it is an extraordinary tribute to 
Joyce’s power of realistic evocation that all the fancy narrative techniques of Ulysses 
are unable to dim the vivid presence of Poldy and Molly.29  
 
In order to argue that Ulysses belongs to the modernist ‘culture of redemption’ that he 
critiques, Bersani engages in an excess of the banal disguised as celebration that must first 
separate form from content, designating the former as ‘fancy narrative technique’ and the 
latter as truth, which here takes the form of the self-present and fully realized psychological 
character – the symbol of the high modernist novel in its humanist mode – in the form of 
Joyce’s ‘realistic evocation’ that renders the ‘vivid presence of Poldy and Molly’, the 
diminutive familiarity of Bloom’s name suggesting the ideological territory he considers the 
novel to be occupying.  
 Barbara Reich Gluck tacitly presumes this link between the perceived power of the 
word as the foundation of a humanist worldview when she states that ‘[f]ailure to 
communicate, or to believe in the possibility of doing so, entails alienation. Beckett’s 
characters increasingly divorce themselves from all human society […] On the other hand, 
Joyce’s characters and his fiction, grounded in the word, soar ever upward and out’.30 It 
follows for Gluck that Bloom is ‘a model of l’homme engagé’ , the epitome of this 
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association between the stability of language, conceived as  possessing positive and malleable 
properties, and a belief in the undivided communication of the self therein.31 As this 
interpretation centres particularly on the character of Leopold Bloom, I wish to nuance it by 
forwarding a reading of what I propose to be an interconnected textual chain, the first 
instance of which is taken from ‘Cyclops’. The initial scene is that of Bloom and Joe Hynes 
in Barney Kiernan’s pub, discussing the late Paddy Dignam’s insurance policy: 
 
- Same again, Terry, says Joe. Are you sure you won’t have anything in the way of 
liquid refreshment? says he. 
- Thank you, no, says Bloom. As a matter of fact I just wanted to meet Martin 
Cunningham, don’t you see, about this insurance of poor Dignam’s. Martin asked 
me to go to the house. You see, he, Dignam, I mean, didn’t serve any notice of the 
assignment on the company at the time and nominally under the act the mortgagee 
can’t recover on the policy. 
- Holy Wars, says Joe, laughing, that’s a good one if old Shylock is landed. So the 
wife comes out top dog, what? 
- Well, that’s a point, says Bloom, for the wife’s admirers. 
- Whose admirers? says Joe. 
The wife’s advisers, I mean, says Bloom. (U 12.758-69). 
-   
 
In an elegant example of parapraxis, the reader is led to believe that while Bloom intends to 
say ‘advisers’, his unconscious is revealed through the Freudian slip and we are reminded 
that he is thinking about Molly’s assignation with Blazes Boylan – her ‘admirer’. There are 
further slippages still, in this passage; we know that one of the characters in ‘Cyclops’ is the 
dog Garryowen, and are invited to assume that Joe formulates his question to Bloom – ‘top 
dog?’ – because the dog is next to him in the bar and, by virtue of physical proximity and 
visual awareness, it is proximally syntagmatic in his speech as in his mind. This suggests the 
representation of a semiotically constructed consciousness implicated in language, rather than 
a humanistically rendered psychology conceived as prior to, and available for, expression in 
that language as a transparent medium. Closer reading reveals a further semiotic link in this 
chain, and suggests that it is not only Joe who is prompted by dogs in ‘Cyclops’. Here it is 
necessary to shift back to episode six, ‘Hades’, and to the moments before Bloom, who is 
travelling in the carriage, happens to see Boylan in the street, when he is thinking about the 
conception of Rudy and musing that it must have occurred on the morning when Molly was 
looking out the window watching two dogs copulating: 
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My son. Me in his eyes. Strange feeling it would be. From me. Just a chance. Must 
have been that morning in Raymond terrace she was at the window watching the two 
dogs at it by the wall of the cease to do evil (U 6.76-9) 
 
Bloom then passes the dogs’ home, which prompts him to think about the loyalty of dogs to 
their owners and his father’s dog Athos, who pined away after Rudolph Bloom’s suicide: 
 
Gasworks. Whooping cough they say it cures. Good job Milly never got it. […] Dog’s 
home over there. Poor old Athos! Be good to Athos, Leopold, is my last wish. Thy 
will be done. We obey them in the grave. A dying scrawl. He took it to heart, pined 
away. Quiet brute. Old men’s dogs usually are (U 6.121-8). 
 
Just after this moment, Bloom begins to think about Blazes Boylan coming to visit Molly that 
afternoon and, almost as if he has materialized him, Boylan crosses their path. What is 
happening in the single example in ‘Cyclops’, when Bloom seems to inadvertently reveal his 
preoccupation with Molly’s infidelity while discussing Mrs Dignam, has it genesis in these 
passages in ‘Hades’. The figurative mention of the dog by Joe, which might be said to be 
already a moment of linguistic slippage on his part, prompted by the literal Garryowen, 
recalls to Bloom that period earlier in the day when he was thinking about  dogs en route to 
Dignam’s funeral. That, in turn, recalls the moment when his musings were interrupted by 
seeing Boylan, which thought recalls his wife to him and reveals his anxiety over her 
assignation in the slippage ‘admirers’. What would otherwise be considered as a revelation of 
character psychology, of Bloom the family man and the complex but quotidian travails that 
render him a multi-faceted and rounded character in the humanist mode, is ultimately offered 
up as a pattern of signification revealed in a textual chain. It infers by implication that 
language in Joyce is not conceived as a stable and present, albeit malleable and experimental, 
medium that by extension allows for the representation of a self prior to language and 
available to full and present articulation within the world of the text, nor does it express a 
psychologically realist and self-present character available for portrayal . The condensation 
of Dignam and dogs that crystallizing  around Molly and Boylan suggests further that Bloom, 
the apparent archetype of rounded  character, stands as a challenge to the humanist Joyce he 
is made to enshrine and to readings that identify Ulysses as humanist by virtue of what they 
designate, implicitly or explicitly, as its maximalism. 
The framework of one man on one day vaunted by maximalist and humanist reading 
that would reduce Ulysses to the tale of a simple soul traversing Dublin reveals itself instead 
to be indissociable from the linguistic processes from which such readings seek to sever it, 
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and from a fundamental incompletion at and as the centre of Joyce’s writing which refutes 
the possibility of  offering a redemption of the modern world, the latter being dependent on 
viewing language as a self-present and transparent vehicle for the mimetic representation of a 
humanist worldview that would recuperate a fragmented culture. The liberal humanism 
identified with the maximalist mode and attributed to Joyce is determined by the view that 
people are  in control of language, which is then simply a medium for the expression of an 
already-constituted self and world available to representation. This then allows us to re-
examine what Joyce meant when he states, of Finnegans Wake, ‘[j]e suis au bout de 
l’anglais’, and to consider that Joyce is at the end not only of English but of language as a 
medium capable of redeeming lack through its own plenitude, since he presents language 
itself as constitutive of that lack and in doing so rejects the totalizing and recuperative 
worldview attributed to high modernism.32  
When discussing Beckett’s search for an art that would express an ‘authentic 
weakness of being’, Michael O’Sullivan locates that quest  in his ‘syntax of weakness’, 
achieved by writing in French.33 By associating the linguistic aspiration towards reduction 
with a worldview, O’Sullivan relates ‘a style of representation or […] linguistic capacity’ 
with ‘a broader assessment of the human condition’ and so unites formal weakness, 
expressive of ‘the inadequacy of signification’, to a philosophical interest in ontological 
weakness .34 The dissolution of form reflects the correlative inadequacy of language and 
being, and is ordinarily identified in Beckett as both a reaction to, and emancipation from, 
what he perceived to be a Joycean control over form, reflective in turn of an omniscient and 
essentially metaphysical worldview located in a mastery of knowledge. If Joycean writing 
were instead to be considered as expressing the impossibility of mastery over and of 
language, rather than its control, both writers can then be regarded as postulating a similar 
connection between formal and ontological incompletion. Such a reading would entail 
reviewing the standard perspective on the sheer proliferation of quotidian detail and 
ephemera in the later Joyce, figured as encyclopaedic in intent; it would also necessitate a 
revisiting of the length and scope of those works as maximalist and therefore completist, as 
well as of their polyphony of voice, which reaches a zenith in the linguistic overlaying of the 
Wake and its palimpsestuous puns. Maximalism encourages the identification of these 
signifiers of size, quantity, and length with correlative metaphysical abstractions (the via 
positiva delineated by Barth), and in literary terms with a humanist faith in the integrity of the 
individual. Were these signifiers to be disarticulated from that content, the axiomatic 
connection between formal excess and philosophical plenitude could in turn be disinvested. 
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Instead of being mutually exclusive of a sense of the inadequacy of language, this would 
entail reconsidering Joycean maximalism as an articulation of that inadequacy and would 
involve reading Ulysses and Finnegans Wake as expressions of the superfluous rather than 
the replete, the excessive rather than the abundant. If, in the work of Beckett, the expression 
of insufficiency as a concomitant of the interrelation of ontological and linguistic weakness is 
correlated to a mimetic reduction in quantity of text, in Joyce it could be considered as 
finding expression in a proliferation indicative of a drive that cannot be satiated and is always 
already doomed to failure. Albeit from different positions, Beckett and Joyce can then be 
read as both attempting to express the same view of language as attenuated, performed in 
text; the difference between the two would be that, whereas in Beckett there is a visible 
mimeticism between form and content, in Joyce excess would be the symptom rather than the 
correlative. When Robert McAlmon detailed his reminiscences of Joyce he recalled 
particularly when the latter read Ulysses read to him  one night:   ‘he wept […] while 
explaining his love or infatuation for words, mere words’.35 Although in love with words to 
the point of tears, the view of the prison-house of language initiated in A Portrait indicates an 
ambivalence over its potential rather than a celebration thereof. This ambivalence is then  
carried through to the excessive accumulation of the later texts, motivated by a view of the 
simultaneous violence and poverty of language; this would allow excess in Ulysses and 
Finnegans Wake  then to be interpreted as divorced from values of totality or mastery, and at 
best to be read as a compulsive realization of their  inachievability.  
Within recent discussions of Joycean maximalism, both Jeremy Colangelo and 
Friedhelm Rathjen endorse the principle  in Joyce while seeking to nuance it. Colangelo’s 
Bakhtinian reading emphazises the polyphony of Ulysses and negotiates the Borgesian 
impossibility of representing the world in a book by arguing that incompletion is 
paradoxically the generator of its maximalism: 
 
The detail, in putting the text in direct confrontation with the world it represents in all 
its complexity, invests the text with that world’s overwhelming gigantism, which 
necessarily means that the representation of that world will be incomplete. However, 
this incompleteness is not a failure, but the mechanism by which the text’s 
maximalism comes to exist. The gigantic depends on the existence of an outside, on 
the drawing of a limit.36 
 
 
While Colangelo reconciles the failure of completion with the aspiration towards it, 
Friedhelm Rathjen argues that Joyce and Beckett should be regarded in terms of a Bloomian 
 13 
clinamen wherein the ‘radicalism’ of one impels that of the other.37  Making analogy with the 
Brunonian ‘identity of opposites’ discussed in ‘Dante … Bruno. Vico .. Joyce’, Rathjen cites 
Beckett in that essay in order to argue that the two writers meet at the point at which their 
extremes coincide: 
 
The maxima and minima of particular contraries are one and indifferent. […] The 
maximum of corruption and the minimum of generation are identical: in principle, 
corruption is generation”. […] At least metaphorically, Bruno’s principle can be said 
to fit the Joyce-Beckett relationship: The maximum of Beckett and the minimum of 
Joyce are identical: in principle, Beckett is Joyce.38 
( 
Although claiming that they can be reconciled through this diametric opposition, Rathjen 
follows Beckett’s own self-depiction by portraying him as ‘the great minimizer’ in reaction to 
‘the maximizer Joyce’ , and pursues that logic to claim that Joyce functions in this dynamic 
to ‘collect fragments of reality which are to be added up to establish a complete world, 
whereas Beckett uses this movement negatively to make room for the unspeakable between 
fragments of language that lose their correlation to any worldly reality’.39 . Other recent 
criticism postulates a more elaborated  view of the fissure between the two; as can be seen, 
for instance, in P. J. Murphy’s claims that Joycean influence continued in Beckett beyond the 
early work through a series of echoes, allusions, and in particular an ongoing textual 
engagement with A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man.40 Dirk Van Hulle also cautions that 
their projects are not as antinomic as Beckett himself claimed, utilizing a genetic approach  to 
suggest a continuum that undermines the binary of control versus impotence and inferring  a 
subversion of maximalist-minimalist predicates.41 Stressing that ‘the circular structure of 
Finnegans Wake was a cunning trick to put an end to what essentially remains a process’, 
Van Hulle endorses H. Porter’s Abbott’s assessment of the importance of Work in Progress 
to Beckett’s own writing, particularly its ‘incompletion’, suggesting that the lack of telos in 
Beckett’s works finds its foundation in Joyce 42 Van Hulle similarly points to the degree of 
control exercized over the authorial process by Beckett, stressing to the  extent this 
contradicts his  claim of anti-mastery made to Israel Shenker: ‘Beckett's “no how” as a writer 
implies the know-how to create and carefully refine his composition in order to admit the 
decomposition to become part of it’.43 . Ultimately, Van Hulle concludes  
 
But in this respect, Beckett's nohow is not that different from Joyce's know-how. The 
idea to integrate decomposition in the composition process is inherent in “Work in 
Progress” and repeatedly mentioned in Finnegans Wake. Joyce's plan was to write a 
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history of the world. “But the world, mind, is, was and will be writing its own wrunes 
for ever” (FW 19.35–36).44  
 
 
Maximalism conventionally relates the excess of the novel to totalization , its elaboration to 
exhaustion and, ultimately, a wholeness by which size (of syntactical unit, paragraph, 
lexicon, and finally text) is taken to be constitutive of a philosophy embedded and reflected 
by the text. Joyce might therefore be seen  as an anomaly rather than an exemplar, in that his 
work exhibits a maximalist accumulation of size and a proliferation of words that are 
nonetheless axiomatically closer to the tenets that are thought to be formally constitutive of  
literary minimalism. If for Beckett every word is ‘like an unnecessary stain on silence and 
nothingness’,45 a similar instinct can paradoxically be identified in Joyce, for whom the 
accretion of words can be interpreted not as a celebration but rather a drive to obliteration, the 
same drive that in Beckett finds expression in subtraction. The conflation of the addition of  
words with epistemological encyclopaedism is subverted if excess can be reconciled as 
insufficiency, and accretion as a factual detritus that shores fragments against ruin. This 
permits Joycean writing to be re-evaluated in these terms as both too much and not enough, 
displaying a surfeit or intemperance that nonetheless encode the same view of the limitation 
of language as expressed in Beckettian minimalism. In philosophical terms, both can be 
considered to evince a minimalism that is only subsequently identified in one by virtue of an 
appropriation of its literary effects. Though Beckett’s dream of being ‘without style’46 is 
clearly another step on from the Joycean book of the night, both could be interpreted to be 
impelled by the same view of language in its relation to being, albeit  that view finds diverse 
expression not only across  their works but at different stages within the oeuvres of each 
writer. Although Beckett himself constructed his increasing asceticism in contradistinction to 
the Joycean project,47 seeking instead to express the ‘experience of a non-knower, of a no-
can-er’  in Joyce we find a plurality that nonetheless indicates inadequacy rather than 
repletion, and that in its suggestion of the impossibility of an Ur-language unites the younger 
writer, for whom the ‘not enough’ of language is expressed as paucity, on a continuum with 
Joyce, in whose work there is also the expression of an inherent lack in being, intimated as an 
artistic vision interlinked to language and its generation of the ‘human’.  
When nuancing the popular attribution of encyclopaedism to Joyce, Van Hulle notes 
that the stance is undermined in the work regarded as its embodiment when he draws 
attention to the ironic pose adopted by Joyce in this ‘circular enterprise [..] “writing its own 
wrunes for ever”’ (FW 19.36).48 . The ending of Finnegans Wake, in fact, underscores this 
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undermining, as in the echo of ‘Penelope’ in the monologue of Anna Livia Plurabelle it 
doubly and reciprocally inscribes the ending of Ulysses – an ending which is performatively 
infinite and thus without closure – and emphasises this ‘circular’ strategy that resists the 
conventional association signified in the term maximalism between a certain prodigality of 
writing and the invitation to a concomitant wholeness or totalization as the philosophy of the 
text. At the end of ‘Against “Ulysses”’ Leo Bersani identifies a yearning for Joyce, akin to 
Jacques Derrida’s ‘admiring resentment’, declaring that ‘to stop working on Ulysses is like a 
fall from grace’ .49  He need not mourn its loss, for Finnegans Wake suggests that as Joyce 
has no beginning, he also has no end.  Its last words are not final, the two last words on that 
lacking finality – ‘Finn, again!’ (FW 628.14) – repeating the inconclusion of ‘a loved a long 
the’ as repetition itself, returning to the ‘riverrun’.   There is no conclusion, as the 
punctuation of the stars gives way to the forgetting of an ending and a plunge back into the 
absence of a beginning.  It is not clear, in the end, which are the final words, the first or the 
last; there is an incompletion at the end as at the beginning, in fact an incompletion at the end 
because there is one at the beginning, which is the absence of the origin at the end of the 
book.  Tellingly, both Ulysses and Finnegans Wake end in increasingly impotent words; 
Joyce stated of the former that ‘I had sought to end with the least forceful word I could 
possibly find. I had found the word ‘yes’, which is barely pronounced, which denotes 
acquiesence, self-abandon, relaxation, the end of all resistance’, and concluded that in Work 
in Progress, 
 
I’ve tried to do better if I could. This time, I found the word which is the most 
slippery, the least accented, the weakest word in English, a word which is not even a 
word, which is scarcely sounded between the teeth, a breath, a nothing, the article 
the.50 
  
One might think here of  Breath, and of an ‘[e]xpiration and slow decrease of light together 
reaching minimum together’.51 The ending of Finnegans Wake demonstrates that there can be 
no last words in Joyce, and therefore that there is always something that is both unsaid and 
left to say. This textual strategy of simultaneous insatiability and incompletion runs counter 
to maximalist absolutism, and the lack of a final word, in both senses, can be sensed at the 
end of the Wake where the monologue of ALP courses through its last pages. The flow of her 
reflections might equally be read as the presaging of a Beckettian minimalism: ‘[i]t’s 
something fails us’, she thinks, ‘[f]irst we feel. Then we fall’ (FW 627.11). Passing out into 
the sea, her ‘cold mad feary father’ (FW 628.2),  
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till the near sight of him, the mere size of him, the moyles and moyles of it, moananoaning, 
makes me seasilt saltsick and I rush, my only, into your arms. I see them rising! Save me 
from those therrble prongs! Two more. One two moremens more (FW 628.2-6).             
 
As there are always ‘two more’ meanings, for ‘one two moremens more’, the infinite 
invitation to the possibility of ultimate satisfaction is one which can never be fulfilled, as a 
perpetual doubling of meaning prevents a totality of meanings. Tyrus Miller writes of the 
periodization of late modernism that 
 
Our historical plots have beginnings, middles and ends; births and deaths occur; there 
are fixed settings and spaces of errancy; times of decision and dreamtimes in which 
the logic of the day seems suspended or deranged.52 
 
A study of Joyce’s later work challenges definitions of maximalism and minimalism in so far 
as the terms imply a coincidence between form and textual value, demonstrating a tension 
between two dispositions at play in the novels. If A Portrait sets out a thematics that becomes 
formalized and, passing from an intratextual principle, becomes elevated to the level of a 
textual philosophy, we can reconsider that writing as an art of accretion but not of 
completion, and perceive in his  work a kind of minimum that reorients readings of both 
Joyce and Beckett, placing their projects on a continuum rather than situating them as 
epochal exemplars. In Joyce we are confronted with ‘minimally less. No more’  even as each 
sweet word accrues, it is nevertheless that ‘sweet one word’ – ‘less’ 53 – that affords the 
opportunity to hold together these twin pressures of a philosophical and formal minimalism 
coupled with an aesthetic maximalism, his books of the day and the night creating a space of 
errancy in the historical plot of modernism that upset a narrative of beginnings, middles and 
ends by which the period is constituted. 
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